As the UK Supreme Court Blog points out, our highest court of appeal has updated the "frequently asked questions section" of its website.
Of particular interest are the answers to two questions. The first is probably the most important question the public ever asks about the court, namely whether, once a case has wound its way through the expensive and long-winded English court system, the final decision of the court can overrule the UK parliament. Appropriately, the question is the first on the list. The answer is no:
No it cannot. Unlike some supreme courts in other parts of the world, the UK supreme court does not have the power to 'strike down' legislation passed by the UK parliament. It is not the court's role to formulate public policy, but to interpret law and develop it where necessary, through well-established processes and methods of reasoning.
So far, so straightforward: any law student could tell you that the UK parliament is sovereign, and this means that, unlike in the United States, no court, including the supreme court, can strike down legislation passed by Parliament.
That being said, what exactly amounts to "interpreting" law is up for debate. The Human Rights Act empowers courts to "read" legislation in such a way as to give effect to the European Convention on Human Rights, and this can, confusingly, lead effectively to provisions being rewritten by courts (see recent post on fathers rights in child hearings). A court can only do so, however, if its interpretation goes with the grain of the legislation. In other words, it cannot make up completely new legislation.
But the FAQs continues to another paragraph. As in many legal judgments, a clear "no" is followed by a "however":
However, the supreme court must give effect to directly applicable European Union law, and interpret domestic law so far as possible consistently with European Union law. It must also give effect to the rights contained in the European Convention on Human Rights.
This is a confusing qualification. It is not really an answer to the original question at all, that is whether the supreme court can overrule the UK parliament. The correct answer to that question is "no". The second paragraph in fact highlights, without making the position any clearer, that odd constitutional position of the court when it is faced with European law, including the European Convention on Human Rights.
One of the slightly bizarre features of our legal system is that we have a supreme court, populated by our most senior and respected judges, which can no more tell our parliament what to do than it can decide the tactics for the England football team.
However, by virtue of article 46 of the European Convention on Human Rights, the government must "abide by", that is, it must follow, final decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, a court based in Strasbourg of which hardly a lawyer in England could name a single judge.
Hence the recent political clashes over the voting rights of prisoners, imposed on the UK by the European court, leading to an unsatisfactory solution which will only cause more trouble for the UK government in the near future. It appears that no politician thinks the Strasbourg decision is worth fighting for.
It is bad enough when politicians and newspapers attack "unelected" UK judges, as Michael Howard has just done, as if judges had somehow hijacked the legal system and could now overrule elected politicians. The simple point is that they cannot, and the highest legal authorities are still the elected MPs (who should, as they are in the US, be referred to as "lawmakers") who can be petitioned by disgruntled constituents in the normal way.
Moreover, any power that judges have, such as the power to prevent criminals being sent back to their home countries if to do so would breach their human rights, is directly conferred by decisions of parliament and can straightforwardly (well, fairly straightforwardly) be taken away.
But it is more difficult to explain why the actions of UK judges are limited by a constitutional compromise developed over centuries, while European judges have been given enormous power almost via the back door.
This is even more problematic given that some of the UK's most senior judges have said that the Strasbourg court is wrong to aggrandise its own jurisdiction, and should restrain itself from imposing its will on states. If even judges criticise the court's decisions, it is difficult to convince politicians that they should be followed.
The situation becomes more bizarre still, as the UK supreme court (along with all other courts) need only "take into account" judgments of the Strasbourg court. So the supreme court, which is subordinate to parliament in every other way, can do what parliament by its own choice cannot: namely, ignore decisions of the European Court of Human Rights.
A second answer in the FAQ which is of interest for access to justice fans is the question of why court hearings, which are filmed at great expense and televised to practically nobody, are not live streamed on the court's website. I asked this question in a recent blog post. The answer is that it would cost too much:
We do not have the capacity to show our cases live on the website. Our policy is that we only make our recordings available to mainstream broadcasters and educational establishments, because all our footage is recorded digitally in a broadcast-quality format. It is extremely resource-intensive for us to convert our footage to domestic level DVDs or other output formats. Administering and fulfilling such requests is not possible within the court's current resources
It would be useful to know how much it would cost to convert all of the footage automatically. It does sound like a task which could be automated, but who knows. Meanwhile, it is a great shame that the footage, which is paid for with public money, is not available to the public in any real sense.
The UK supreme court has done much since it was set up last year to increase access to justice. Its website, and particularly the invaluable press summaries of judgments, is a supreme improvement over those of the rest of the UK legal system and its example should be followed by other courts.
Its FAQ could perhaps be tweaked in order to make it clearer the for the general public. But it may be that some answers are simply too confusing to be wrestled into a FAQ, and the court can hardly be blamed for our muddled constitutional system.
Adam Wagner is a barrister at 1 Crown Office Row chambers and editor of the UK Human Rights Blog
Parliamentary sovereignty (also called parliamentary supremacy or legislative supremacy) is a concept in the constitutional law of some parliamentary democracies. It holds that the legislative body has absolute sovereignty and is supreme over all other government institutions, including executive or judicial bodies. It also holds that the legislative body may change or repeal any previous legislation and so it is not bound by written law (in some cases, even a constitution) or by precedent.
In some countries, parliamentary sovereignty may be contrasted with separation of powers, which limits the legislature's scope often to general law-making, and judicial review, where laws passed by the legislature may be declared invalid in certain circumstances.
Many states have sovereign legislatures, including the United Kingdom,Finland, the Netherlands,New Zealand,Sweden,Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Barbados, Jamaica, Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands.
Main article: Parliamentary sovereignty in the United Kingdom
Parliament means, in the mouth of a lawyer (though the word has often a different sense in conversation) The King, the House of Lords, and the House of Commons: these three bodies acting together may be aptly described as the "King in Parliament", and constitute Parliament. The principle of Parliamentary sovereignty means neither more nor less than this, namely that Parliament thus defined has, under the English constitution, the right to make or unmake any law whatever: and, further, that no person or body is recognised by the law of England as having a right to override or set aside the legislation of Parliament.
— A.V. DiceyIntroduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (1885)
During the 17th century in England, a notion developed that Parliament (made up of the House of Lords and House of Commons) shared in sovereignty with the King, based on an entirely erroneous notion of the history of parliament. It was not until the changing of the Coronation Oath in the Coronation Oath Act 1688 as part of the Glorious Revolution that Parliament was recognised as part of the constitutional structure, with laws being considered to emanate from Parliament and not just the King. The Bill of Rights 1689 and Claim of Right Act 1689 were passed the following year which asserted certain rights of the Parliaments of England (which at the time included Wales) and Scotland and limited the powers of the monarch. Furthermore, in 1698 parliament created the Civil List, a financial arrangement that left the monarch reliant on parliament for income.
After 1689 English parliamentary supremacy became evident in the relation of the English parliament to those of Scotland and Ireland. The Act of Settlement 1701 made a presumption upon Scotland: the Scots retaliated with the Act of Security 1704, which was countered by the Alien Act 1705: the issue was settled by the Union of the parliaments of England and Scotland in 1707 which created a new British parliament, though "in essence it was just an extension of the English parliament". It is arguable whether the concept of parliamentary supremacy arose from the Acts of Union 1707 or was a doctrine that evolved thereafter. The autonomy of the Parliament of Ireland also came under attack and the Declaratory Act 1720 made the Irish parliament a dependency. The so-called Constitution of 1782 removed British parliamentary supremacy over Ireland for a short period but then the Irish parliament was merged with Britain's in the Acts of Union 1800.
The doctrine of parliamentary supremacy may be summarized in three points:
- Parliament can make laws concerning anything.
- No Parliament can bind a future parliament (that is, it cannot pass a law that cannot be changed or reversed by a future Parliament).
- A valid Act of Parliament cannot be questioned by the court. Parliament is the supreme lawmaker.
Some scholars and judges have questioned the traditional view that Parliament cannot bind itself, arguing that it can impose procedural (or "manner and form") restrictions on itself, since the legislature must be constituted and regulated by legal rules.
The notion of parliamentary sovereignty began to be challenged with the Parliament Act 1911 which changed the nature of what was meant by parliament, as Dicey regretfully noted in the Introduction to the 8th edition of his Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (1915), but that while the reality was now Cabinet and political party were supreme (pp lxxii–lxxiv), in law parliament was still sovereign albeit that "the share of sovereignty" of the Commons had increased (p xlii).
European law does not recognize the British concept of parliamentary supremacy. The UK courts currently recognize the supremacy of EU law on those subjects where the EU can legislate. However, this supremacy conceptually derives from the European Communities Act 1972 and its successors. No sovereign state has ever withdrawn from the European Union (except for the withdrawal of the North AfricanDépartments of France at Independence to become Algeria, and also of Greenland by Plebiscite), but since the passage of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009 there is now a defined process for doing so. On 23 June 2016, a majority of the British people voted to leave the EU.
Scotland and the Acts of Union
See also: House of Lords Act 1999 § Bill
Some jurists have suggested that the Acts of Union 1707 place limits on parliamentary sovereignty and its application to Scotland. Although no Scottish court has yet openly questioned the validity of an Act of Parliament, certain judges have raised the possibility. Thus, in MacCormick v. Lord Advocate, the Lord President (Lord Cooper) stated that "the principle of the unlimited sovereignty of Parliament is a distinctively English principle which has no counterpart in Scottish Constitutional Law", and that legislation contrary to the Act of Union would not necessarily be regarded as constitutionally valid. Also, in Gibson v Lord Advocate, Lord Keith was circumspect about how Scottish courts would deal with an Act, which would substantially alter or negate the essential provisions of the 1707 Act, such as the abolition of the Court of Session or the Church of Scotland or the substitution of English law for Scots law.
The establishment of the Scottish Parliament in 1998 has implications for parliamentary supremacy. For example, although nuclear power is not within its competence, the Scottish government successfully blocked the wishes of the UK government to establish new nuclear power stations in Scotland using control over planning applications which is devolved. While it remains theoretically possible to dissolve the Scottish Parliament or legislate without its consent in relation to Scotland, in practice such a move would be politically difficult.
England and the UK generally
Parliamentary supremacy is cited by contemporary American legal historians as the reason English law did not develop due process in the American sense. It is also argued to be integral to the way in which England's approach to rights and liberties evolved.
The doctrine of parliamentary supremacy, in English Law, was upheld in 2005 by Lord Bingham in the case of R (Jackson) v Attorney General:
The bedrock of the British Constitution is … the Supremacy of the Crown in Parliament.
However, there is a distinction to be made between legal sovereignty and political sovereignty. Parliament is not politically sovereign, which means that if Parliament passes unpopular or oppressive legislation, then it may not be applied in practice; for example, the various civil servants who administer laws within government departments may be relied upon to use any loopholes and vague language which exists in a Bill to get around unwanted areas, and the judiciary is likely to purposefully interpret and create precedent for said laws in a similar manner. However this does not necessarily mean that Parliament is not legally sovereign. It is argued that nonetheless Parliament can legally pass any legislation it wishes. This point is made clearly by Lord Reid in Madzimbamuto v Lardner-Burke  1 AC 645:
It is often said that it would be unconstitutional for the United Kingdom Parliament to do certain things, meaning that the moral, political and other reasons against doing them are so strong that most people would regard it as highly improper if Parliament did these things. But that does not mean that it is beyond the power of Parliament to do such things. If Parliament chose to do any of them, the courts would not hold the Act of Parliament invalid.'
In recent years some judges and scholars in Britain and New Zealand have questioned the traditional view that parliament is sovereign. Others, however, have rejected these arguments. Various constitutional changes in the United Kingdom have influenced the renewed debate about parliamentary sovereignty:
- The devolution of power to devolved legislatures in Scotland (Scottish Parliament), Wales (Welsh Assembly) and Northern Ireland (Northern Ireland Assembly): All three bodies can pass primary legislation within the areas that have been devolved to them, but their powers nevertheless all stem from the UK Parliament and can be withdrawn unilaterally. The Northern Ireland Assembly, in particular, has been suspended multiple times due to political deadlocks.
- The UK's membership of the European Economic Community, later the European Union, from 1973: The EU represents, as the European Court of Justice ruled in 1963 in the case Van Gend en Loos, a "new legal order of international law for the benefit of which the [Member] States have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields". The UK became part of that legal order, though as UK membership of the EU has been brought about through Acts of Parliament – principally the European Communities Act 1972 – Parliament could, as a matter of UK law, pass further legislation unilaterally withdrawing the UK from the Union, or selectively barring the application of European law within the UK. The European Union Act 2011 reaffirmed that sovereignty lay with the British Parliament, with section 18 stating: "Directly applicable or directly effective EU law (that is, the rights, powers, liabilities, obligations, restrictions, remedies and procedures referred to in section 2(1) of the European Communities Act 1972) falls to be recognized and available in law in the United Kingdom only by virtue of that Act or where it is required to be recognised and available in law by virtue of any other Act." The Act also requires that a referendum be held when more powers are transferred to the European Union (though this can be repealed with another Act of Parliament). Alternatively, as prescribed by the 2016 Brexit referendum, an Act to withdraw from the European Union could be passed in parallel with the withdrawal procedure laid down in Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty, whereby a Member State would notify the European Council of its intention to secede from the Union and a withdrawal agreement would be negotiated between the Union and the State. The Treaties would cease to be applicable to that State from the date of the agreement or, failing that, within two years of the notification.
- Following the case of Thoburn v Sunderland City Council certain statutes are perceived to be protected as Constitutional Statutes. The case involved amendments to the Weights and Measures Act 1985 by the Weights and Measures Act 1985 (Metrication) (Amendment) Order 1994 pursuant to Directive 80/181/EEC. This stated that Imperial measurements could be displayed so long as the metric measurements were displayed in larger type beside them. Thoburn was convicted for only displaying Imperial measurements. In his defence he argued that allowing even limited use of Imperial measurements was inconsistent with the European directive and therefore in contravention of Section 2(2) of the European Communities Act 1972, and that the relevant section of the 1972 Act had therefore been implicitly repealed. However, the judgement by Lord Justice Laws held that certain statutes of constitutional importance, including Magna Carta and the European Communities Act 1972, could not be repealed by implied repeal. The case also introduces the concept of a 'hierarchy of acts', which is used in other European countries, to English constitutional law. However, if Parliament did make its intention to overrule any statute express then any statute can be repealed, and so sovereignty is preserved.
- The enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998 which incorporates part of the European Convention on Human Rights into domestic law. The Act gives UK courts the power to issue a declaration of incompatibility where they believe that the terms of an Act of Parliament are in contravention of the rights guaranteed by the Human Rights Act. The effect of the declaration is not to annul the contravening Act but to send a signal to Parliament which may then choose to amend the offending provision. This does not endanger Parliamentary sovereignty because Parliament may choose not to amend the offending provisions. As with the UK's membership of the European Union, the principle of parliamentary supremacy means that Parliament can at any time vote to repeal the Human Rights Act, and indeed the UK's ratification of the Convention itself.
However, Parliament may theoretically withdraw from commitments it has made or repeal any of the constraints it has imposed on its ability to legislate.
Under federal system, neither the states nor the federal parliament in Australia have true parliamentary sovereignty. The Commonwealth Parliament is created by the Constitution, and only has enumerated powers. Each state's legislative power is inherent, but restrained by the Federal Constitution, State Constitution, and commonwealth powers.
In this context, parliamentary supremacy has two meanings: one is that parliament (the legislature) can make and unmake any law; another meaning is that as long as parliament (legislature) has the power to make laws regarding a subject matter, the exercise of that power cannot be challenged or reviewed by judiciary. The second meaning is more consistent with the federal system and the practice of judicial review, as judiciary cannot review on the merits of the parliament (legislature)'s exercise of power.
Blackshield and Williams explain that "[i]n Australia, the idea of Parliamentary Sovereignty must be understood in the context of the rigid limits and boundaries imposed by the federal Constitution, and to some extent by the State Constitutions as well." The constitution confers the power to make laws in the Commonwealth Parliament, however, this limited to particular subjects. Section 128 of the federal constitution prescribes the mode to alter the constitution, which further restricts the power of the Commonwealth Parliament.
The supremacy clause (section 109 of the constitution) gives Commonwealth laws precedent over state laws. The state law-making power is therefore constrained where the Commonwealth has concurrent law-making power. Furthermore, regarding the subject matters which Commonwealth has concurrent legislative power, Commonwealth parliament can 'cover the field', which means the Commonwealth can by express words or implication exclude the operations of state laws. The Commonwealth parliament has exclusive legislative power over the subject matters listed in sections 52 and 92 of the constitution, which means that the states cannot make laws in these areas. Also under section 96 of the Constitution, the Commonwealth can use financial assistance to entice states to refrain from exercising their legislative powers, such as refraining from collecting income tax.
Each state parliament power is subject to procedural limitation, which is the entrenchment of restrictive legislative procedure. Section 6 of the Australia Act states that laws concerning the "constitution, power or procedure of the parliament" are invalid unless passed in the manner and form prescribed by the legislation made by the parliament. However, restriction of this kind is not inconsistent with parliamentary sovereignty.
Over the last forty years or so, a change has been observed in Belgium in the relationships between the Judiciary and Parliament. "The dogma of absolute inviolability of the parliamentary assemblies has been breached. The parliamentary assemblies are now accountable not just to the electors but also to the courts. A first breach in the dogma of the inviolability of the assemblies was opened up by the Le Ski judgement of 27 May 1971, in which the Court of Cassation upheld the supremacy of the norm of self-executing international law. In 1980, Article 142 of the Constitution (former Article 107ter) established a Court of Arbitration in Belgium, nowadays the Constitutional Court, charged with hearing actions for annulment of laws. It would hand down its first judgement on 5 April 1985. (...) A second breach was opened in the dogma of inviolability of the assemblies in Belgium by the Constitutional Court, in its judgement no. 31/96 of 15 May 1996. The Council of State, the highest administrative Court in Belgium, had till then always declared that it had no jurisdiction to hear annulment applications against the administrative acts by the Houses of Parliament. The Constitutional Court, declaring that the absence of any possibility to apply for the annulment of such acts was contrary to the constitutional principles of equality and non-discrimination, opened up a new avenue for judicial review of Parliament’s acts: the laws of 25 May 1999 and of 15 May 2007, adopted in the wake of the Court’s judgement, extended the jurisdiction of the Supreme Administrative Court to the acts and Rules of Procedure of the legislative assemblies or their organs with regard to public procurement and personnel (...) Finally, concerning the decisions taken by the assemblies with regard to MPs or political groups, the civil courts have not hesitated to sanction them when subjective rights were at stake. MPs "enjoy the protection of their subjective rights by the law courts. This principle applies both for rights deriving from the law in the broad sense and for rights which have a regulatory basis" (Civ. Brussels, 21 April 1997). ".
Legislatures of Canadian provinces are sovereign within matters enumerated to them. Provincial legislatures can make and modify their own codified constitutions by simple majority, as British Columbia did. Other provinces have uncodified constitutions like New Zealand and the United Kingdom.
Similarly, the federal Parliament is sovereign in all matters delegated to it, but most amendments to the federal Constitution may only be made with the consent of both Parliament and two-thirds of provinces containing 50% of the population (the 7/50 rule), or in some cases, unanimous consent of the provinces.
In addition, although a law can be challenged and struck down by a court when found to be in violation of certain sections of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Parliament or provincial legislatures may invoke the notwithstanding clause to allow the law to operate for up to five years, at which time it may either lapse or be renewed.
According to the constitution of Finland sovereign power lies with the people, represented by the parliament. As the highest organ of government the parliament holds supreme legislative power and can override a presidential veto and alter the constitution. There is no constitutional court and the supreme court does not have an explicit right to declare a law unconstitutional.
By principle, the constitutionality of laws in Finland is verified by a simple vote in the parliament. However, the Constitutional Law Committee of the parliament reviews any doubtful bills and recommends changes, if needed. In practice, the Constitutional Law Committee fulfills the duties of a constitutional court. In addition to preview by the Constitutional Law Committee, all Finnish courts of law have the obligation to give precedence to the constitution when there is an obvious conflict between the Constitution and a regular law.
The power to alter and amend the constitution is vested with the parliament, requiring approval either by a two-thirds majority in a single parliament if the proposed alteration is first declared to be urgent by a five-sixths majority of the same parliament, or by a slower procedure of first passing the amendment by a simple majority in the then current parliament and then passing the amendment by a two-thirds majority in the following parliament that convenes after a general election. A Finnish peculiarity is that the parliament can make exceptions to the constitution in ordinary laws that are enacted in the same procedure as constitutional amendments. An example of such a law is the State of Preparedness Act which gives the Council of State certain exceptional powers in cases of national emergency. As these powers, which correspond to U.S. executive orders, affect constitutional basic rights, the law was enacted in the same manner as a constitutional amendment. However, it can be repealed in the same manner as an ordinary law.
Executive power is shared by the President of the Republic and the cabinet. The latter must rely on the confidence of parliament. From the independence of Finland in 1917 up to the constitutional reform of 1999, the president held considerable executive powers, and in particular was able to call a re-election of the parliament at will. In order to strengthen the role of the parliament as the highest organ of government, the constitutional reform constrained most of the presidential powers to be exercised only on the advice of the cabinet.
In India, parliamentary sovereignty is subject to the Constitution of India, which includes judicial review. In effect, this means that while the parliament has rights to amend the constitution, the modifications are subject to be valid under the framework of the constitution itself. For example, any amendments which pertain to the federal nature of the Constitution must be ratified by a majority of state legislatures also and the parliament alone cannot enact the change on its own. Further, all amendments to the constitution are also open to a Judicial Review. Thus, in spite of parliamentary privilege to amend the constitution, the constitution itself remains supreme.
Main article: Israeli system of government
The Knesset, the legislative branch of the Israeli government, has the power to enact and repeal all laws. It enjoys de jure parliamentary supremacy, and can pass any law by a simple majority, even one that might arguably conflict with a Basic Law of Israel, unless it has specific conditions for its modification. The Knesset can adopt and amend Basic Laws acting through its capacity as a Constituent Assembly. The Knesset also supervises government activities through its committees, elects the Prime Minister of Israel and approves the Cabinet of Israel, elects the President of Israel, and recommends the Comptroller of Israel. It also has the power to remove the President and State Comptroller from office, revoke the immunity of its members, and to dissolve itself and call new elections.
The sovereignty of Parliament in Italy is born from parliamentary privilege, but, in one of the most comprehensive and compelling "systemic" judgments, the Constitutional Court (rapporteur Carlo Mezzanotte) had opened the justiciability of ‘’interna corporis’’. By the way, remnants of the old theories are expressed in autodichia, which involves subtracting the ordinary courts of all acts performed within the Chambers. The choice to set off some acts to the Presidents of the Parliament has been criticized as an attempt to exclude them from judicial review, even when pertaining to individual rights: this has given rise to some conflicts between the judiciary and Parliament, brought to the Constitutional Court, who gave useful elements to restrict the legal definition, compelling the legal doctrine through the modern evolution of the sovereignty of Parliament.
The concept of parliamentary sovereignty in New Zealand is derived from that in the United Kingdom:
The constitutional position in New Zealand [...] is clear and unambiguous. Parliament is supreme and the function of the courts is to interpret the law as laid down by Parliament. The courts do not have a power to consider the validity of properly enacted laws.
In recent years, some legal experts such as Robin Cooke in Taylor v New Zealand Poultry Board, have questioned how far parliamentary sovereignty goes. There are several laws and conventions that limit the exercise of parliamentary sovereignty. For example, the maximum term of Parliament and some other matters relating to the electoral system may only be altered by a parliamentary supermajority or by a majority in a popular referendum.
- ^"Parliamentary sovereignty". UK Parliament. Retrieved 17 August 2014.
- ^ abcdOliver, Dawn (2 April 2013). "Parliamentary Sovereignty in Comparative Perspective". UK Constitutional Law Association Blog. Retrieved 17 August 2014.
- ^Pocock, J.G.A The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal LawCambridge University Press (1987) pp234-235
- ^Harris, Tim Revolution: The Great Crisis of the British Monarchy 1685–1720Allen Lane (2006) p349
- ^"The Convention and Bill of Rights". UK Parliament. Retrieved 2 November 2014.
- ^"Britain's unwritten constitution". British Library. Retrieved 27 November 2015.
- ^"Constitutionalism: America & Beyond". Bureau of International Information Programs (IIP), U.S. Department of State. Retrieved 30 October 2014.
- ^"The Financial Revolution". Parliament of the United Kingdom. Retrieved 14 March 2015.
- ^"Rise of Parliament". The National Archives. Retrieved 2010-08-22.
- ^Harris, Tim Revolution: The Great Crisis of the British Monarchy 1685–1720 Allen Lane (2006) p498
- ^Alder, John Constitutional and Administrative Law 7th edition Palgrave Macmillan (2009) p167
- ^W. Ivor Jennings The Law and the Constitution (London: University of London Press, 1st ed., 1933); R.T.E. Latham The Law and the Commonwealth (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1949); Geoffrey Marshall, Constitutional Theory (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1971); Jackson v. Attorney General  UKHL 56 at  per Lord Steyn; Harris v. Minister of the Interior 1952 (2) SA 428(A).
- ^Alder, John Constitutional and Administrative Law 7th edition Palgrave Macmillan (2009) p173
- ^Berry, Elspeth and Hargreaves, Sylvia European Union law Oxford University Press 2nd edition (2007) p39 "The national courts are therefore obliged to give effect to those Treaty obligations, even if this means disapplying national law."
- ^Turpin, Colin & Tomkins, Adam British government and the constitution: text and materials Cambridge University Press (2007) p 335
- ^Loveland, Ian. Constitutional Law, Administrative Law, and Human Rights: A Critical Introduction. 2015: Oxford University Press. p. 43-47. ISBN 9780198709039.
- ^Doherty, Michael (2016). Public Law. Rutledge. pp. 198–201. ISBN 1317206657.
- ^Barnett, Hilaire (2014). Constitutional & Administrative Law. Rutledge. pp. 119–123. ISBN 1317446224.
- ^"The legislative sovereignty of the Westminster Parliament"(PDF). Retrieved 14 January 2017.
- ^Johnson, Simon (16 April 2009). "Cross-border row rages over SNP blocking new nuclear power stations". The Daily Telegraph. London. Retrieved 8 September 2010.
- ^John V. Orth, Due Process of Law: A Brief History (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2003), 28–31.
- ^Jowell, Jeffrey; Oliver, Dawn, eds. (2007). The Changing Constitution (6th ed.). Oxford University Press. pp. 60–1. ISBN 9780199205110.
- ^Gordon, Michael. Parliamentary Sovereignty in the UK Constitution : Process, Politics and Democracy. Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2015. Discovery eBooks, EBSCOhost (accessed November 27, 2015).
- ^ UKHL 56 (Lord Bingham).
- ^Allan, T.R.S. "The Rule Of Law, Parliamentary Sovereignty, And A Ministerial Veto Over Judicial Decisions." Cambridge Law Journal 74.3 (2015): 385-388. Index to Legal Periodicals and Books (H.W. Wilson). Web. 27 Nov. 2015.
- ^ 1 A.C. 645, 723 (Lord Reid).
- ^Taylor v. New Zealand Poultry Board  1 NZLR 394 at 398 per Cooke J; Sir Robin Cooke "Fundamentals"  New Zealand Law Journal 158; Lord Woolf "Droit Public – English Style"  Public Law 72; Sir John Laws "Law and Democracy"  Public Law 72; Sir Stephen Sedley "The Constitution in the Twenty-First Century" in Lord Nolan and Sir Stephen Sedley (eds.) The Making and Remaking of the British Constitution (London, Blackstone Press, 1997); TRS Allan Law, Liberty, and Justice: The Legal Foundations of British Constitutionalism (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1993); Dame Sian Elias "Sovereignty in the 21st Century: Another Spin on the Merry-go-round" (2003) 14 Public Law Review 148; Sir Edmund Thomas "The Relationship of Parliament and the Courts" (2000) 5 Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 9; Philip Joseph "Parliament, the Courts, and the Collaborative Enterprise" (2004) 15 King's College Law Journal 321; Jackson v. Attorney General  UKHL 56 at  per Lord Steyn, at  per Lord Hope of Craighead, at  per Baroness Hale of Richmond.
- ^Lord Bingham of Cornhill The Rule of Law (London, Allen Lane, 2010); Jeffrey Goldsworthy The Sovereignty of Parliament: History and Philosophy (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999).
- ^European Union Act 2011
- ^European Commission websiteArchived 10 May 2010 at the Wayback Machine.
- ^Blackshield and Williams Australian Constitutional Law and Theory, 5th ed, 2010
- ^New South Wales v Commonwealth (WorkChoices Case)(2006) 231 ALR 1
- ^South Australia v Commonwealth (1942) 65 CLR 373 ("the First Uniform Tax case")
- ^Attorney-General (NSW) v Trethowan  HCA 3; (1931) 44 CLR 394
- ^N. IGOT, A. REZSÖHAZY, M. VAN DER HULST, Parliament & Judiciary, ECPRD Seminar - Brussels, 8-9 Novembre 2007, p. 12-14.
- ^ British North America Act, 1867, Section 91
- ^http://web.eduskunta.fi/Resource.phx/parliament/relatedinformation/constitution.htx Constitution of England. Retrieved on 2009-01-27.
- ^Parliamentarism-thisisFINLAND, Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
- ^"All-party meet vows to uphold Parliament supremacy". The New Indian Express. 2 August 2013. Retrieved 18 August 2013.
- ^According to https://www.academia.edu/12695276/Autorecensione_dello_Scudo
- ^Buonomo, Giampiero (2003). "Italia condannata su ricorso del procuratore Cordova". Diritto&Giustizia edizione online. – via Questia(subscription required)
- ^It is also expressed by other constitutional organs and Regional Councils: professor Giuliano Amato complained "right of all meetings of constitutional status (Chambers and regional councils, therefore ) to self-manage everything related to their organization. And then, among other things, do their budget, allocate between the various items the money available, check how they are spent" (I soldi di tutti e l’autodichia, 30 settembre 2012, quoted by https://www.academia.edu/10805826/Finanziamento_degli_eletti_e_dei_partiti_politici ).
- ^(in Italian)Giampiero Buonomo, I controlli giurisdizionali resistono ai tentativi di ampliare l’indipendenza.
- ^(in Italian)Giampiero Buonomo, Gli atti amministrativi delle Camere non possono modificare la legge.
- ^See Giampiero Buonomo, Lo scudo di cartone, 2015, Rubbettino Editore, p 224 , ISBN 9788849844405.
- ^(in Italian)Giampiero Buonomo,L’autodichia parlamentare di nuovo in Corte costituzionale.
- ^(in Italian)Giampiero Buonomo, Il diritto pretorio dell’autodichia, tra resistenze e desistenze.
- ^Judgment no. 120/2014 "looks at Europe by addressing the legal doctrine to the modern evolution of the sovereignty of Parliament, in the era of rationalized parliamentarianism": Buonomo, Giampiero (2015). "L'antipolitica ha un argomento in meno". Mondoperaio edizione online. – via Questia(subscription required)
- ^Rothmans of Pall Mall (NZ) Ltd v A-G  2 NZLR 323 at 330 (HC).
- ^Taylor v. New Zealand Poultry Board  1 NZLR 394 at 398 per Cooke J; Sir Robin Cooke "Fundamentals"  New Zealand Law Journal 158; Dame Sian Elias "Sovereignty in the 21st Century: Another Spin on the Merry-go-round" (2003) 14 Public Law Review 148; Sir Edmund Thomas "The Relationship of Parliament and the Courts" (2000) 5 Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 9; Philip Joseph "Parliament, the Courts, and the Collaborative Enterprise" (2004) 15 King's College Law Journal 321.